Department of the
Army
Headquarters, 1st
Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
APO San Francisco
96265
AVDDA-BRC 30 April 1969
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report for
Operation Wayne Grey
Commanding General
4th
Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDDH-CC-MH
APO 96262
1.
Name of
Operation: Operation Wayne Grey
2.
Date of
Operation: 1 march 1969 - 14 April 1969
3.
Location: Plei Trap, Kontum Province, RVN.
4.
Command and Control
Headquarters: Headquarters, 1st
Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
5.
Reporting Officer: COL Hale H. Knight
Commanding
Officer
1st
Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
6.
Task
Organization: Annex A.
7.
Supporting Forces:
a. 6-29TH Arty (DS)
b. C/1-92 Arty (GS)
c. 1 plat C/6-14 (175MM) (GS)
d. 7th Air Force
e. B/4th Eng (DS)
f.
4th Avn
Battalion
g. 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion
h. 7-17th Cavalry (_)
i.
D/1-10 Cavalry
8.
Intelligence:
a.
Intelligence
indicated the 66th NVA Regiment and the 24th NVA Regiment
with supporting artillery elements from the 40th Artillery Regiment
along with sapper units were staging for attacks against Kontum City, Polei
Kleng Special Forces Camp, fire support bases west of Polei Kleng and probable
interdiction of the LOC's from Pleiku north to Kontum, Dak to and west from
Kontum to Polei Kleng.
b.
The 66th
NVA Regiment moved north in late January and February, skirting the contacts
between the 24th NVA Regiment and FWMAF in the Chu Pa Mountain area
(YA9568). In late February, captured
"Red" Documents, POW Interrogation Reports, and aerial reconnaissance
of the Polei Kleng area and firebases west of Polei Kleng, indicating plans for
offensive operations in the area. The
K25 Engineer Battalion was identified in documents directing coordination with
the 40th Artillery Regiment for construction of a road from Plei Moi
(YA8493). The enemy's efforts to
construct roads deep into the mountain range east of the Plei Trap, continued
improvement of trails and roads from the Cambodian Border into the Chu Mom Ray
area and signs of vehicular traffic in the northern Plei Trap and to the east
indicating heavy supply activity and probable use of artillery or even tanks in
the planned attacks.
c.
Suspected enemy
strengths and probable locations were:
Unit Strength Location
66th
NVA REGT 1275 VIC
YA 8182
HQ &
Support Units 550
7th
BN 240
8th
BN 250
9th
BN 235
40th
NVA REGT UNK Tri
Border Area
K25 Engr
BN/B3 Front 250 YA 8493
H67
Dispensary UNK YA
8381
d.
Enemy Forces
Encountered. When a 3-12th
Infantry combat assaulted into key terrain (YA8396) to secure IZ Swinger as a
firebase to support the assaults of the 3-12th and 1-8th
Infantry Battalions, the company was in immediate contact with NVA in
bunkers. Fighting to secure the base,
they killed 30 NVA and captured an NVA WIA, a 12.7 AAMG, LMGs, other small
arms, and antihelicopter mines. The
enemy element was apparently prepared to ambush a helicopter assault on the
abandoned firebase. Documents taken
from the KIA and statements from the POW identified the unit as the K25B
Engineer/Sapper Bn. The AA MG also
indicated at least a small supporting artillery element.
1.
1-8th Inf
Area of Operations: On 2 March, A/7-17
Cav, screening the combat assault of 1-8th Inf swept the area
capturing the two Russian two ton trucks and 61 rounds of Chicom 105 Howitzer
ammunition. One of the trucks and
ammunition were evacuated. On 5 March,
at YB819019, an ambush killed 4 NVA and captured one NVA who later died of
wounds. The POW and documents captured
identified the personnel as a recon element of the C-10 Co, K9 Bn, 66th NVA
Regt and that the element was performing a route and position reconnaissance
from the northern Plei Trap to the east of Chu Mom Ray (Hill 1773) and south
toward Polei Kleng Special Forces Camp.
As action continued in the area south of FB 20, LZ Swinger received
incoming 105-mm artillery fire with suspected enemy locations to the NW near
the location of the captured vehicles.
Subsequent search of the area by the Air Cav, Cider RACs, and ground
elements resulting in destruction of six additional trucks and the capture of
two 105mm howitzers at YB779028 on 7 March.
The howitzers were old US weapons used by the enemy. Significant ground contacts were made by A
and C/1-8th Infantry on 12 March, vicinity YB8500. Small element contacts continued throughout
the month of March, with no new unit identifications made. In the 1-8th Inf area of
operations, ground contacts, the 7-17 Air Cav, airstrikes and artillery fires
resulted in 125 confirmed NVA KIA and 2 POWs.
In late March, prior to evacuation of FSB 20 and TF A loc (YB804034),
the positions received heavy 105 mm fire for several days from locations near
the Cambodian Border vicinity YB724061.
Artillery and airstrikes destroyed one o the weapons and possibly
destroyed 2 or 3 additional weapons. On
27 March, at YB830992, C/7-17 av observed what appeared to be a camouflaged
vehicle park. The ARP was inserted and
checked the area finding 3 rounds and 60 expended shell casings of 85 mm
assault gun ammunition. The 3 rounds
were evacuated.
2.
3-8 Infantry Area of
Operations: A, C, and D Companies of the 3-8 Inf combat assaulted into LZs
south of LZ Mary (YA784916) and moved towards the enemy's rear and the
suspected location of the H67 Dispensary (YA830815). On 3 March, vic YA808879, 3-8 Inf made contact with an estimated
NVA Bn in well-constructed bunkers.
Fierce fighting followed with D Company moving from the southwest to
secure Hill 947 (YA813864) and B and C Companies combat assaulting on the ridge
south of A company's contact and moving south along the ridge. In this battle, confirmed NVA KIA and
captured several weapons. Documents
captured in the contacts identified the K8 Bn, 66th NVA Regt, and
the 25B Engineer Bn B3 Front. The
enemy's determination to hold the ridgeline, and other intelligence later
developed, indicate a control headquarters was located south of the contact
area. Although not confirmed, an NVA B3
Front Forward CP may have been in the area.
Enemy activity in the 3-8th Inf area of operations remained
extremely light for the remainder of the operation except for the harassing
fires against LZ Swinger.
3.
3-12th Inf
area of operations: Following A
Company's assault on LZ Swinger, elements of the 3-12th Inf combat
assaulted into the Plei Trap. In
reaction to the 3-8th nf action, TF Swift (B, D, and Tcn/3-12) moved
to the southeast to assist in sweeping the area and to attack south into Cu Don
(YA8081). In scattered contacts
throughout the area 3-12th Inf elements killed 114 NVA. Major contacts were made at YA818840,
YA820855, and YA828811, on 20, 29, and 30 March respectively. In all contacts except the 29 March sapper
attack at LZ D-HANDLE, the enemy was well dug in and protected by the dense
jungle and heavy overhead cover. In the
29 March contact, the enemy employed an 82-mm mortar preparation followed by a
company sized attack of sappers using B40 rockets and satchel charges. The enemy attack was repelled resulting in
26 NVA KIA. Documents captured in the
contacts identified elements of the NVA 66th Regt and K25B Bn and B3
Front. A document captured by D/3-12
on 26 March at YA808852 indicated an infiltration route running from SW
vicinity YA7683, toward Polei Kleng.
e.
Significant
Intelligence: Captured documents, POWs,
captured weapons, vehicles, and munitions confirmed the accuracy of
intelligence information available prior to and throughout the operations. POWs and documents identified the 66th
NVA Regt with the K7, K8, and K9 Bns, the K25B Engineer Battalion and elements
of the 40th NVA Artillery Regiment.
Observation of improved roads by aerial surveillance and ground
reconnaissance along with the capture and destruction of Russian trucks, 105 mm
howitzers, 105 mm and 85 mm Chicom ammunition confirmed the enemy's
capabilities to provide logistical and fire support for attacks deep into South
Vietnam.
f.
Terrain: Throughout the area of operation, the
terrain consisted of steep slopes and deep valleys. The jungle canopy was tripled layered with 150' high trees in
many areas.
1.
Observation: The dense jungle greatly reduced observation
from the air and ground and prevented long range observation of likely avenues
of enemy movement.
2.
Fields of fire. The dense jungle severely restricted
employment of flat trajectory weapons except at very close ranges or with
extensive clearing of firing lanes.
3.
Cover. The steep hill masses, deep ravines and
dense vegetation provided good cover throughout the area of operations, except
along the Plei Trap Valley floor and in the relatively flat terrain leading
from the Northern Plei Trap to the east and the north of Chu Mom Ray, (Hill 1773).
Even in these areas, the cover was fair.
4.
Concealment. Throughout the area, dense jungle and broken
terrain provided excellent concealment against ground the air observation,
often completely hiding hardened positions and trail networks that were later
found when artillery, air strikes or chemical defoliation destroyed the canopy.
5.
Obstacles. The steep
slopes and dense jungle were obstacles to any type vehicular movement and
hinder foot movement in the steepest areas.
Steep banks make most streams obstacles unless extensive work was done
to provide a fording site.
6.
Avenues or
movement. Routes of movement generally
follow the valley areas and cross the hill masses in the saddles. Major avenues in the area extended from the
Cambodian Border (Northern Plei Trap to the south along the Plei Trap Valley
and to the east along the valley floor south of FSB 20 (YB8208) and north of
Chu Mom Ray).
g.
Weather: Throughout the operation, the weather was
clear and permitted effective use of air assets except for ground haze that
occasionally limited visibility and two severe thunderstorms accompanied by
rain and high winds that disrupted aerial support. The heavy rains that delayed the final extraction from FSB 20
would have been a critical factor had they continued throughout the late
afternoon and prevented completion of the extraction.
9.
Mission: 1st Brigade conducts offensive
operations in Plei Trap area to destroy enemy forces, prevent reinforcement and
supply of the 66th and 24th NVA Regiments from Cambodia,
and prevent their withdrawal into Cambodia.
10. Concept of Operations:
a.
Phase I. The 1st Brigade conducted
offensive operations with its three associated battalions: 1-8th
Infantry, 3-8th Infantry and 3-12th Infantry and its
direct support artillery battalion. 6-29th Artillery. Initially, the battalions conducted combat
assaults into previously used firebases on the eastern Plei Trap to establish
adequate artillery fire support positions.
With artillery support established, rifle companies combat assaulted
into the western Plei Trap behind main enemy forces and on his infiltration
routes. Upon landing, the companies
moved eastward quickly in reconnaissance in force operations into base areas
and ambushed known enemy lines of communication. Maximum use was made of artillery and air strikes to interdict
enemy interdict enemy movement of logistics.
Once maneuver elements fixed enemy forces, all available firepower was
brought to bear upon him (Overlay 1)
b.
Phase II. The 1st Brigade continued
offensive operations by establishing company size blocking positions astride
access routes to interdict enemy withdrawal.
Ambushes and short range patrols were placed on enemy routes of
withdrawal. Artillery fire programs and
chemical drops covered routes of egress not under observation of ground
troops. Enemy troop units, which
concentrated, were struck by B-52 bombers.
Air Cavalry screened the western AO to detect and interdict enemy movement
in or out of the area. Artillery was
used to a maximum on all suspected and confirmed enemy locations. Air strikes were used to destroy enemy
bunker complexes, and saturation bombing was used on enemy troops concentrated
in the Cu Don. Once enemy resistance
was broken, US Infantry swept the area in clean up operations. (Overlay 2)
11. Execution:
a.
General: On 27 February, 1st Brigade
received the mission to deploy to Polei Kleng for staging an assault into the
northern Plei Trap area. Reliable
intelligence indicated that two regiments were staging for an attack on Polei
Kleng and Kontum. The Brigade mission
to prevent the withdrawal of the 24th and 66th NVA
Regiments into Cambodia and to cut their lines of communication. On 28 February, all battalions were
marshaled for deployment to Plei Trap.
1-8th Inf and 3-8th Inf convoyed to Polei Kleng
while 3-12th Inf extracted to Plei Mrong.
b.
Initial
assaults. On 1 March, the move into the
Plei Trap began with A/3-12th Inf combat assaulting into FB Swinger
from Plei Mrong. The firebase was
occupied by enemy troops who had prepared positions and anti-helicopter mines
on the LZ. The artillery prep destroyed
a 12.7 mm AA position and the assault went as planned. After a three-hour battle, bunker to bunker,
the FB was secured and C/1-92nd Arty (155) was moved in. Enemy losses were 30 KIA and 1 POW. US casualties were 1 KIA and 13 WIA. Combat assaults were then conducted by B/1-8th
Inf into FSB 20 an C/3-8th Inf into Firebase Pause followed by
A/6-29th Arty and C/6-29th Arty respectively. At the end of the day, the fire support
bases were established for troop assaults the following day.
On 2 March,
simultaneous combat assaults were conducted by the 1-8th Inf and the
3-8th Inf. D/18th
and C/18th assaulted into LZ Susan and began RIF operations along
the enemy roads in the area. A/1-8th
Inf combat assaulted into LZ Turkey to establish a blocking position and
conduct ambush operations along routes of egress. A, B, and D/3-8th Inf combat assaulted to LZ Mary to
establish a firebase. C and B/3/12
combat assaulted to YA734953 and YA743974 respectively to RIF east. The initial positioning was completed on 3
March with the combat assault of D/3-12th to YA 747923.
c. Plei
Trap Road 1-16 March: With
intelligence pointing to increased road activity in the northern Plei Trap,
C/1/8th Inf and D/1-8th Inf were assigned missions of
conduction RIF operations east along the roads from LZ Susan (YA742032). A/1-8th Inf and Rcn/1-8th
Inf were put in a blocking position at LZ Turkey (YB 805015). During the combat assault of C and D/1-8th
on 2 March, ground fire was received by a gunship just north of LZ Susan. A/7-17th Cav was committed to the
area to screen the eastward movement of the rifle companies. At YB 765032, a scout observed two enemy
trucks with ammunition. The LOH
received fire from the area and an air strike was employed resulting in two
trucks destroyed, 6 NVA KIA, and 8 secondary explosions. C/1-8th swept the area and found
the Russian made 1 1/2 ton trucks, 61 rounds of 105 mm ammunition, and 1200
lbs. of rice. At 1850 hrs an ambush
patrol from A/1-8 Inf made contact with 2 NVA with a LMG at YB820015. Small arms fire was exchanged and during the
sweep by 4A/1-8 contact was made with a dug in force. Small arms fire and artillery were employed resulting in 2 NVA
KIA and 1 US WIA. On 3 March C/1-8 Inf
continued the RIF along the southern road while 1 platoon assisted the
evacuation of the captured truck.
Contact was made with an unknown size force at YB 756036. A/7-17 Cav, screening the area, located and
engaged the enemy resulting in 4 NVA KIA and 1 US WIA. D/1-8 Inf continued the RIF along the
northern road with negative results.
On 4 March the RIF continued along the southern road to
locate the enemy artillery battery known to be in the area. That afternoon the 3-12th Inf CP
at FB Swinger received incoming 105 mm.
A/7-17 Cav was sent to recon the suspected firing positions. Counterbattery fire was employed by the
artillery with unknown results. C/1-8
Inf captured another truck vic YB777025.
It was driven to an LZ but was destroyed due to lack of air assets for
evacuation. On 5 March at YB 819019 an
ambush patrol from A/1-8 Inf killed 2 NVA.
While moving back to the company location, 2 more NVA were seen and
engaged, resulting in 1 NVA WIA/CIA. An
ambush from C/1-8 killed 1 NVA at YB813022.
After the ambush was sprung, the US troops received fire from the rear
resulting in 2 US WIA. Artillery was
employed with unknown results. At 1500
hours as C/1-8 continued the RIF along the southern road, heavy contact was
made vic YA 807025. The order was given
to break contact due to the heavy engagement in the 3-8th AO. Contact was broken and C/1-8 withdrew to an
LZ and was extracted to A/1-8 location (YB822032). Results of the contact were 7 NVA KIA, 3 US KIA, and 11 US WIA.
On 7 March, A/7-17
Cav, searching in area of suspected enemy 105 locations, found 2 105 mm
howitzers at YB779028. Airstrikes and
gunships were employed resulting in 1 artillery piece destroyed and 1 possibly
destroyed. On 8 March, A/7-17th
found a truck at YB 778018. An
airstrike uncovered another truck, which was also destroyed by artillery and
gunships. At YB 780002, A/7-17 found a
third truck , which they destroyed with artillery and gunships. On 10 March D/1-8 combat assaulted to YB
770026 with the mission to extract the 2 105-mm howitzers. At YB 777018, contact was made by the point
element with 1 NVA. The NVA was killed
and an SKS captured. In the immediate
area of the howitzers, 2 disabled trucks were destroyed w/thermite
grenades. Another truck was uncovered
and also destroyed by thermite grenades.
Thirty (30) rounds of Chicom 105-mm ammunition were destroyed in
place. The howitzers were extracted to
Polei Kleng.
On 9-10 March, 3 B-52 strikes were employed on the area to
the north of FB Swinger. A/1-8 and
C/1-8 were given the mission to make a bomb contact with an estimated NVA
company dug in bunkers. C/1-8 Inf,
working squad at YB 847006. A/7-17 Cav
screened during the battle. Tracer 5,
forced to escape and evade that night.
Results of the battle were 33 NVA KIA, 2 US KIA, 13 WIA, and 4 US
MIA. From 13-15 March, A and C/1-8
followed up in the contact area to recover MIAs. On 13 March at YB 852011 contact was made by A Co. resulting in 4
NVA KIA. That night, A and C companies
were mortared at their night location with no casualties suffered. On 15 March A and C/1-8 again received 8
rounds of mortar fire in their base resulting in 2 WIA. Three of the 4 US MIA returned to the patrol
base that afternoon.
A/7-17 Cav screened in support of 1-8th
operations throughout this time. On 15
March they found 1 enemy platoon at YA 861986.
Gunships expended resulting in 10 NVA KIA. From a BDA of an airstrike at YA 855955, the scout section found
1 12.7 AA weapon destroyed and 5 NVA KBA.
Another airstrike at YA 854977 destroyed 6 bunkers and killed 9 NVA.
The Plei Trap Road operation was significant n interdicting
an enemy main supply route. The
destruction of 6 trucks and 2 howitzers curtailed movement of enemy artillery
toward Polei Kleng and stopped the flow of supplies to the 40th NVA
Artillery Regiment. With a US battalion
astride its line of communication, the enemy was forced to decide on a new
course of action rather than support an attack on Polei Kleng.
d. LZ
BRACE 3-7 March: At 1530 hours, 3 March
69, A/3-8th Inf closed into what was believed to be their NL at YA
803879. A security patrol was sent out
from the perimeter and found 2 NVA fleeing east from the perimeter toward the
top of the hill. A platoon pursued and
became engaged. The remainder of the
company reinforced and made contact with an estimated battalion perimeter. After a 1 1/2 hour firefight, the company, after sustaining several casualties
and mission, withdrew into a perimeter and contact was broken. Gunships, AC-47 Spooky, and artillery were
employed throughout the night, around the perimeter. At 0950 4 Mar, A3-8th sent a patrol to check the area
of the previous contact and locate the missing personnel. Contact was made almost immediately and the
patrol withdrew to the perimeter. The
enemy then launched an attack w/grenades and B-40 rockets. A/3-8th Inf was forced to fight a
retrograde movement to an LZ at YA 790885 and was extracted to Firebase Pause
at 1500 hours.
At 1125 hours, 4 March, B/3-8th Inf attempted a
combat assault to YA828899 with the mission of moving down the ridgeline to
reinforce A/3-8th Inf. The
assault was postponed because automatic weapons fire was encountered on the
LZ. A second attempt was made at 1328
and again fire was received. After a
preparation by air strike and screening by A/7-17th, B/3-8th
was inserted at 1540 hours and moved south, joining Rcn/3-8th at YA
825890 for their night defensive location.
D/3-8th continued to move up the ridge from
YA800856 to establish a block and prevent enemy withdrawal to the south. While moving to Hill 947 (YA14869), the
company found a well used trail with telephone wire laid along side the
military symbols carved in the trees.
Hill 947 was reached without opposition. As the company moved further north, contact was made with an
unknown site force, resulting in 4 NVA KIA and 1 US recaptured. The returned US soldier revealed the
presence of a larger enemy force to the north.
D Co was then ordered to reoccupy Hill 947 and prepare a defensive
position to block enemy withdrawal from the area. At 1640, D Co received a probe from an estimated two enemy
squads. Throughout the night of 405
March, D/3-8th had heavy movement and probes by sapper units. Enemy attempts to neutralize outposts were
thwarted. At 0750, 5 March, an
estimated two enemy companies reinforced with sappers launched an attack
against D Company's east side. The
attack was preceded y mortars, B-40 rockets, and CS; however, it was broken by
artillery and gunships. At 0825, D Co
successfully counterattacked to retake OP's.
For the rest of the morning, D Co received probes and sniper fire. At 1340, the enemy attacked again with 1
company on the east and 1 company on the west.
Again the attack was preceded by a mortar barrage. A FAC spotted the enemy mortars and
destroyed them with an air strike. The
ground attack was repelled in fifteen minutes of fierce fighting. Enemy probes continued for the remainder of
the day including sapper attacks on the first platoon perimeter. Spooky and artillery were employed around
the perimeter and in enemy assembly areas.
B/3-8 continued its attack south on 5 March with Rcn/3-8
attached. A/1-35 was OPCON to 3-8th
Infantry after being lifted to LZ Pause.
C/3-8 was then combat assaulted to YA828899 at 1035 hrs. The lead aircraft received fire and the
assault was postponed. Also B/3-8 began
receiving fire from the hill at YA8288880 (BRACE) and employed artillery. At 1320, C/3-8 again attempted a combat
assault to YA828899 and was successful.
The company then moved south to reinforce B/3-8 and Rcn/3-8. The two companies linked just prior to
darkness.
As the major enemy fore had been located in the Plei Trap,
the 1st Brigade consolidated forces throughout the area of
operations to prepare to meet any new threat.
In the 3-12 Inf AO, B/3-12 and D/3-12 were moved to LZ Mary. C/312 was extracted to FSR Swinger. In the 1-8 Inf AO, D/1-8 was ordered to
contact, and was extracted to LZ Turkey.
1-35 Inf (-) CHOP 1st Bde and began moving to Polei Kleng.
On 6 March, B and C/3-8 began a coordinated assault on
BRACE. B Co moved within 150 meters of
the top when they received heavy AW fire.
An attempt by B Co to maneuver east and C Co to maneuver wet were
unsuccessful. Artillery fire with delay
fuses were employed without success.
The companies withdrew fire with delay fuses were employed without
success. The companies withdrew part
way down the hill and airstrikes w/750 lb delay fused bombs were employed. At 1700 the attack commenced again. At 1720 C Co secured the top of the hill and
B Co joined shortly thereafter to consolidate a defensive position.
D/3-8 on Hill 947 repelled a ground attack at 0700 on 6
March. The attack was preceded by a
mortar preparation, to include CS rounds.
Again scouts and gunships from A/7-17 Cav were used to neutralize the
enemy mortars. After 20 minutes the
enemy was driven off. After a perimeter
sweep, D Co then made preparations for resupply and evacuation of the wounded.
In order to block enemy withdrawal to the west from BRACE,
the 3-12 Inf formed Task Force Swift (B, D, Rcn/3-12). TF Swift moved overland from LZ Mary on 6
March to the southeast to block or destroy enemy forces in the area.
On 6 March, the 1st Bde continued the attack on 7
March by airlifting C/3-12 from FB Swinger to Hill 947 to reinforce D/3-8. TF Swift was extracted from YA788883 to
BRACE. The task force attacked and
secured the middle hill (YA815872) on 7 March without contact. 1-35 Inf(-) was airlifted from Polei Kleng
to LZ Mary to conduct search and destroy operations and block enemy withdrawal
to the west of BRACE. On 8 March Task
Force Swift attacked south and linked with D/3-8 and C/3-12. No further contact was made. Results of the entire action were 241 NVA
KIA, 32 US KIA, 125 US WIA, and 1 US MIA.
LZ BRACE was the most significant battle of Operation Wayne Grey. The 3-8 Infantry engaged reserve elements of
the 66th NVA Regiment and rendered them ineffective. The losses sustained by the enemy by body
count alone prohibited further employment of that unit. Also, the 3-8 Infantry had fought and
defeated the enemy in a conventional battle through proper employment of fire
support and maneuver. The steadfastness
and determination of the fighting man on the ground was the key to success in
this battle.
e.
Task Force Swift
10-14 March: After consolidation on
Hill 947, TF Swift received the mission to make bomb damage assessment of 3 B52
strikes which would be made to the south of Hill 947. On 11 March, the task force received mortar fire and countered
with airstrikes and artillery. At 1145
hrs at YA817861, a SRP from C/3-12
round 4 NVA bodies and fresh blood trails. A platoon was sent to sweep the area. At 1420 hours the platoon made contact with an unknown size force
at YA 818858 and received mortar fire.
C Co moved to reinforce, and B Co moved to secure a withdrawal
route. Contact was made with an
estimated enemy company. Due to the
proximity of a B52 strike, the companies broke contact and withdrew to the task
force perimeter. On 12 March TF Swift
attacked again and secured the objective at YA818956. Once there, they received mortar and small arms fire resulting in
15 US WIA. Airstrikes and artillery
were employed with unknown results.
Results of the action were 5 NVA KIA, 10 US KIA, and 56 US WIA.
On March 15, the 1st Bde began a new phase of
operations, moving into company-sized blocking positions and using ambush
operations, artillery, airstrikes, B52 strikes, and chemical munitions to block
and interdict enemy withdrawal. In the
3-12th Inf, A/3-12 was moved to IZ Mary on 13 March prior to a
combat assault to a new LZ (LZ CIDER) YA829799. The assault was made the following day unopposed and was followed
by C/3-12, Hq/3-12, and B/6-29 Arty.
B/3-12 and D/3-12 moved overland to vic YA808856 LZ D-HANDLE. After A/3-12 assaulted to LZ CIDER. C and D/3-8 constructed a firebase at
BRACE. On 16 March, Hq/3-8 and A/3-8
and C/6-29 Arty moved to BRACE from LZ PAUSE.
In the 1-8th Inf AO, D/1-8 closed into FB 20. A and C/1-8 moved to Hill 467 YB803034 and
were constituted into Task Force Alpha.
f.
Plei Trap Road
Interdiction 16-30 March: As the 1st
Bde began its second phase of operations, the 1-8th Infantry was
assigned the mission of interdicting the Plei Trap Road so as to prevent enemy
vehicular movement in the area through the monsoon. The mission was to be accomplished by running road interdiction
to the east from FB 20 and interdiction on the south from Hill 467 (YA803035). A and C/1-8 on 16 March began moving from
YB847003 to Hill 467. A/7-17 Cav.
Screening their move, located an NVA truck vic YB838068 and destroyed Hill
467. On 19 March an ambush of A/1-8
made contact with a dug in force at YB805053 resulting in 1 US KIA and 1 US
WIA. The ambush pulled back and
employed artillery. On 20 March A Co
swept the contact area again making contact with an unknown sized force
resulting in 4 NVA KIA, 1 US KIA, and 11 US WIA. On 21 March, A/1-8 was airlifted to FB 20 and B/1-8 was moved to
Hill 467.
From 21-23 March ambushes and road interdiction were
continued around the area. Contacts
were small resulting in 5 NVA KIA, 1 US KIA, and 9 US WIA.
On 23 March activity increased with enemy attacks by
fire. FB 20 received seven 105 WP
rounds, twenty 105 HE, and various mortars and RR rounds. On 24 march, FB 20 again received an
undetermined number of 105 rounds. Hill
467 received indirect fires, sniper fire and B40 rockets on its east and west
perimeter. Security sweeps of the area
resulted in 1 NVA KIA. On 25 March,
B/1-8(-) returning from a road interdiction mission, made contact with an
estimated platoon of NVA at YB795020.
Contact was broken at 1230 and reinitiated at 1413 resulting in 5 NVA
KIA, 2 US KIA, 11 US WIA, and 6 US MIA.
Simultaneously, Task Force Alpha came under attack with B40 and small
arms. The attack was repelled resulting
in 5 NVA KIA, 1 US KIA, and 13 US WIA.
The task force continued to receive sporadic 60mm and 82mm fire.
On 26 March FB 20 again received incoming 105mm during the
afternoon. A total of 20 rounds
impacted in and around the firebase resulting in 3 US KIA and 8 US WIA. Also B/1-8(-) linked with D/1-8 and moved
back to Hill 467. Four MIA from B/1-8
rejoined the unit at that time. Shortly
thereafter, Task Force Alpha began receiving incoming small arms and B40, 82mm
mortar, and 105mm artillery. No
casualties were suffered. On 27 March
FB 20 received 19 rounds of 105mm resulting in 2 US WIA. Airstrikes and artillery were employed in
counterbattery. Task Force Alpha
received sporadic sniper and B40 rounds, especially during the airlift of D/1-8
to FB 27. C/1-8 was sent to sweep the
perimeter but was forced to return when they received incoming 105mm artillery. A total of 15 105 rounds impacted including
one propaganda round with leaflets exhorting the US soldiers to surrender. No US casualties were suffered. On 28 March Task Force Alpha had several
sightings and movement. Mortars and
artillery were employed with unknown results.
Also they received 120 rounds of incoming 105 mm resulting in 1 US KIA
and 4 US WIA. D/1-8 reported a convoy
of NVA trucks north of FB 27. Artillery
and mortars were employed with unobserved results. On 29 March, FB 20 received a total of 16 rounds of 105 with no
casualties suffered. Artillery and
airstrikes were again employed on suspected firing positions. At Task Force Alpha sporadic sniper and B40
fire were received. Small arms, mortar,
and artillery were employed, resulting in 5 NVA KIA and 1 US WIA. On 30 March, 1-8th Inf began a
tactical withdrawal from their AO. Task
Force Alpha was evacuated with aircraft and ground troops receiving small arms
and B40 fire. No casualties were
suffered. In the evacuation of FB 20,
the enemy fired a total of 40 rounds at the firebase. An Air Force smoke screen was used to cover the move with the
extraction being completed at 1830 hours.
D/1-8 was extracted to Polei Kleng from FB 27 without incident.
The enemy action in the 1-8th AO had twofold
significance. First, the intensity of
the attacks by fire indicated the enemy intention of inflicting casualties and
damage on American firebases and preventing resupply. Second, the enemy ground activity around Task Force Alpha was
designed to contain American forces while enemy equipment was withdrawn or hidden
in the area. No major attacks was ever
launched against the patrol base; however, the harassment to cover movement
from the area as evidenced by repair work on the craters and abatis made by the
1-8th Infantry on the Plei Trap road.
g.
On 15 March - 14
April: The Cu Don is a mountain on an
extension of the ridge south of BRACE.
It was a known enemy base area and suspected to be on the withdrawal
route of the 66th NVA Regiment.
As the first Bde entered Phase II of Operation Wayne Grey, the 3-12 Inf received
the mission of establishing blocking positions and interdicting enemy movement
through the area. On 14 March, A, Rcn,
and C/3-12 combat assaulted to LZ CIDER (YA829799) to establish a firebase. The following day, B/6-29 Arty moved to LZ
CIDER. B/3-12 moved to a patrol base at
YA818856, and D/3-12 established a firebase for the 4.2 mortars at LZ D-HANDLE
(YA821853).
On 18 March, 3D/3-12 on a RIF became heavily engaged at
YA817839. 2D/3-12 was sent to reinforce
and made contact with an NVA force, which came between the two platoons. With support from airstrikes, artillery, and
gunships, the platoons were able to link and break contact. Results were 7 NVA KIA, 4 US KIA, 19 US WIA,
and 3 US MIA. On 19 March, the bunker
complex at YA8178839 was attacked by airstrikes all day. That evening LZ CIDER was probed with small
arms and M79 fire resulting in no friendly casualties and 1 NVA KIA.
On 20 March, D/3-12 attacked south to capture the bunker
complex on Hill 800 (YA817839). The
attack was supported by airstrikes, artillery, and gunships. Enemy forces held the position, but 2 MIA
were recovered. D Co withdrew to LZ
D-HANDLE/ From 1845-2315 hours, LZ
CIDER received a heavy weapons attack from 82-mm mortars and 75 mm RR. There were no casualties and only slight
equipment damage.
D/3-12 attacked Hill 800 again on 22 March after heavy air
and artillery bombardment. The hill was
seized without opposition and all US MIA were recovered. 4 NVA KBA were found in the bunker
complex. From 23-26 march 3-12 Inf
units conducted patrols and ambushes throughout the area of operations.
On 27 March, 3A/3-12 on a local security patrol, made
contact with 4 NVA at YA826811, killing 2.
The platoon was then engaged by automatic weapons and B40 rockets. They withdrew 200 meters and sent the WIA
back to LZ CIDER. A/3-12 moved from LZ
CIDER, linked with the platoon, and moved into the contact area after an
artillery preparation. Again automatic
weapons fire was received. The company
withdrew to LZ CIDER leaving 8 MIA in the area of contact.
On 28 March A/3-12 again moved to vic YA826811 to recover
the MIA. As the company entered the
contact area, they received small arms fire from an estimated 2 platoons. Contact was broken and artillery and mortars
were employed. As the company withdrew,
they received 60 rounds of 82 mm and 60-mm mortar fire. No casualties were suffered.
At 2245 on 28 March, SRP 43 at YA812845 near LZ D-HANDLE
reported observing 9 NVA. Mortars were
employed to force the NVA toward B/3-12 ambush. The NVA, however, moved toward SRP 43 and claymores were employed
resulting in 4 NVA KIA. At 2900600, the
ambush platoon from B/3-12 observed 3-5 NVA at YA823858. As they waited for the enemy to enter the
killing zone, they received 3 rds B40 resulting in 4 US WIA. The platoon then observed 15-20 NVA moving N
carrying 3 NVA. The unit engaged with
small arms and artillery resulting in 5 NVA KIA and possible 10 NVA killed by
artillery. Also at 0600, at LZ
D-HANDLE, the enemy launched a sapper attack under cover of a weapons
attack. B and D/3-12 received 50 rounds
of 82-mm mortar and sappers destroyed two bunkers with B40 rockets. The attack was repelled by small arms and
artillery. A patrol from B/3-12 later
killed another 2 NVA during a sweep of the area. Results of the entire action were 27 NVA KIA, 2 US KIA, and 28 US
WIA.
On 30 March, A/3-12 moved to recover the MIA from the
contact of 27 March. The bodies were
found vic YA826811, but the enemy again attacked with small arms and mortars. The company was ordered to withdraw and did
so fighting its way back up the hill to YA834814. C/3-12(-) was dispatched to help secure the night location. Contact was broken at 1900 hrs and C Co
linked with A Co at 2000 hrs. At 310035
March, A and C(-)/3-12 received small arms and 150 rounds of 82 mm, 60 mm, and
75 mm RR from vic YA830815. Artillery,
mortars, and Spooky were employed.
There were no US casualties.
In reaction to the locating of a large enemy force in the
vicinity of the Cu Don and the enemy's willingness to remain in fight, five B52
strikes were struck in the area to prepare for the combat assault of 1-22
Infantry. On 2 April 1-22 Inf CHOP 1st
Bde. A and C/1-22 AL to LZ CIDER and
moved overland to YA821795. B, D, and
Rcn/1-22 combat assaulted to YA806827.
On 3 April, the 1-22 Inf attacked toward Objective Red
(YA8280). 2C/1-22 made contact with an
unknown size enemy force at YA816795.
The platoon was reinforced by C/1-22(-) and ordered to withdraw. Results were 1 NVA KIA, 1 US KIA, and 14 US
WIA. B/1-22 made contact with an
unknown size force at YA805818 resulting in 1 KCS WIA. The company withdrew to its NL vic YA808822.
On 5 April C/3-8 AL from YA826906 to Hill 871 (YA806825 CHOP
1-22 Inf. 1-22 Inf moved recon patrols to objective areas to establish blocking
positions. 1D/1-22 on recon observed 4
NVA in bunkers vic YA813823. The
platoon withdrew and airstrikes and artillery were employed. The platoon sent recon patrols in the
afternoon into the area and found an extensive bunker complex. As the unit reconnoitered the hill by fire,
the enemy suddenly attacked from bunkers on top of the hill and from the flanks
with small arms and B40 rockets. 2D/1-22
was dispatched to assist in the evacuation of casualties and also made contact
with a flanking enemy force. Contact
was broken at 1620 resulting in 23 NVA KIA, 20 possible NVA KIA, 1 US KIA, 5 US
KIA (MIA), and 17 US WIA.
From 6-9 April, the objective area was saturated with
airstrikes and artillery. LRPs were
employed to recon the area for evidence of enemy forces in strength. On 10 April, D/1-22 moved to YA815824 and
recovered 4 MIA. L1B found 9 MIA from
A/3-12 Inf. On 11 April D/1-22
recovered 1 MIA and C/3-12 recovered 2 additional MIA. All were evacuated.
On 13 April 1-22nd Inf was final extracted from
the Cu Don to Polei Kleng and CHOP 2d Bde.
A, C, and Rcn/3-8 Inf were also extracted and CHOP 2d Bde. On 14 April 3-12 Inf(-) and 3-8 Inf(-) were
extracted to Mary Lou. 3-12 Inf
prepared for deployment to Camp Radcliff.
3-8 Inf(-) CHOP 2d Bde.
The battles in the Cu Don are significant in the fact that
an enemy base area was disrupted. The
tenacity with which the enemy defended the area gave evidence that he had
something to protect. His attacks by
fire and harassing sniper fires were designed to hold US forces until he could
evacuate or hide his equipment. When US
forces came close to his base, his defenses were organized as ambushes. Despite these designs, the 3-12th
Inf and the 1-22nd Inf were successful in inflicting heavy
casualties on the enemy. An unknown
number of enemy were undoubtedly killed in the heavy air and artillery
bombardment. As the operation
concluded, indications were that the enemy had retreated toward Cambodia.
h.
FB SWINGER: Throughout Operation Wayne Grey, FB Swinger
was subjected to sporadic attacks by fire.
This fire was primarily 82 mm mortar and 75mm recoilless rifle directed
at aircraft and at the 155mm artillery battery. Artillery and mortars were always employed in counter battery fire. Air cavalry screened the area northwest and
northeast of the firebase, but never detected the firing positions. Airstrikes were employed on several
suspected locations with no observed results.
B52 strikes were employed on five occasions when intelligence indicated
a troop concentration in the area, however, the enemy persisted in directing
harassing fires at the firebases.
12
RESULTS
a.
Enemy Losses:
KIA - 575
POW - 4
b.
Enemy equipment
captured or destroyed.
AK-47- 57
SKS - 13
CHICOM rifles - 3
CHICOM assault rifle 1
SOVIET Carbine 1
RPD IMG 9
M60 MG 2
M16 rifle 3
RPG Rocket launcher 5
.50 cal MG (dest) 1
12.7 AA (dest) 1
12.7AA - 1
60mm mortar 1
60mm Mortar (dest) 1
105mm howitzer 2
105mm howitzer (dest) 1
Soviet trucks (dest) 6
Soviet trucks 1
CHICOM AM/FM radio 1
6560 rds 7.62mm
256 rds 12.7mm
25 rds 60mm
51 rds 82mm
3 rds 85mm
4 rds 75mm
91 rds 105mm
22 rds B40 rocket
110 CHICOM grenades
50 booby traps
35 lbs TNT
c.
Friendly Losses:
US KIA - 106
US WIA - 437
US MIA - 8
d.
Friendly Equipment
Losses and Damage:
M16 59
M16 (damaged) 1
M79 4
M60 5
PRC 25 radio